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Abstract
Having reviewed 91 information security (InfoSec)
studies published in top IS journals for a ten-year period
(2004-2014), we discuss technical, behavioral,
financial, and managerial challenges for CIOs and
boards of directors, and offer suggestions for future
practice-relevant research on preventing, preparing
for, detecting and responding to InfoSec incidents.

1. Introduction
The SIM 2015 IT Trends Study lists Security as the
third highest IS investment priority (after Data Analytics
and ERP) -- a sharp rise from #14 in 2013.
Organizations daily confront InfoSec risks from
malicious parties who steal data, intellectual property,
and user credentials; harm software or data quality; and
introduce malicious code that can cause systems to fail.
Careless behavior by employees, customers, and
partners also cause systems to fail or make it easier for
attackers to compromise corporate systems and data.
InfoSec incidents can damage an organization’s
reputation and financial health. Many attacks propagate
both within and across organizations (via distributed
denial of service attacks, exchange of malicious code in
emails or social media, and other mechanisms). IT
professionals, working under the direction of the CIO,
try to prevent InfoSec incidents, prepare for events that
will occur anyway (100% prevention is impossible),
detect incidents that do occur, and rapidly and
effectively respond to reduce negative impacts to
organizations and their customers and business partners.
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Figure 1: Phases of InfoSec Activities
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Prior reviews [1] [2] find that behavioral, technical,
organizational and other factors combine to affect InfoSec preparation and compliance. A meta-review of 1280
papers notes that few relied on empirical research [3].
Another meta-review [4] reports that econometric
models and attitude surveys prevail and that research
with a stronger managerial focus is needed. Here, we
discuss 91 empirical papers published over a ten year
period (see Appendix 1) in the AIS Senior Scholars
Basket of journals (EJIS, JAIS, JIT, JMIS, JSIS, ISJ,
ISR, MISQ), including key findings and implications for
the CIO and boards of directors. Our review method and
justification are explained in the earlier meta-review [4].
Employees are a “weak link” in InfoSec [5], [6], and
behavioral research seeks to understand why users fail
to comply with InfoSec policies and guidelines. Despite
efforts to test and strengthen General Deterrence Theory
(GDT) and to combine it with theories of neutralization
and organizational justice [7] [8] “weak-link” research
reveals that organizations cannot expect employees,
partners or customers to behave optimally. Humans are
fallible; even with the best of intentions users take short
cuts or fall prey to phishing and other social engineering
attacks. Thus, both organizational InfoSec policies and
practice-based research need to move beyond
prevention, and focus at least as much on helping
organizations effectively prepare for, detect and respond
to the breaches that will inevitably occur.
The CIO answers to the board of directors on
strategic IS governance issues, including InfoSec
challenges. Boards are advised to annually review and
critique their organization’s IT security practices and
disaster-recovery capabilities, and to stay abreast of best
practices [9]. We examine these concerns through two
lenses: topics (technical, behavioral, managerial) and
security emphasis (prevent, prepare, detect, respond).
Author Note: Appendix 1 cites 91 papers comprising our
review. To reference papers that were NOT part of the
review set, we use numbered citations (HICSS format). To
reference the 91 empirical papers in the review set, we use
APA (Author, date) form. Also, in the sections that follow
we provide a table listing the specific papers discussed in
that section, in chronological order of publication.
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2. InfoSec Risks and Impacts
Table 1 InfoSec Risks and Impacts Articles
Author/s
Cavusoglu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Cremonini and Nizovtsev
Dey et al.
Galbreth and Shor
Goldstein et al.
Gordon et al.
Hua and Bapna
Kumar et al.
Mookerjee et al.
Png and Wang
Png et al
Ransbotham and Mitra
Wang et al.
Wang et al.
Yayla & Hu

Journal
ISR
JMIS
JMIS
JMIS
MISQ
JAIS
MISQ
JSIS
JMIS
ISR
JMIS
JMIS
ISR
ISR
ISR
JIT

Year
2005
2008
2009
2012
2010
2011
2010
2013
2008
2011
2009
2008
2009
2008
2013
2011

Primary Aim
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Impacts
Impacts
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Impacts

With increases in attacks in recent years, boards
need frequent updates from the CIO on incidents,
standards, and challenges in their particular industries.
In this section we review risk assessment studies that
yield guidance for InfoSec investment decisions. These
studies reveal that no one-size-fits-all rule answers the
question of how much to spend on InfoSec, nor how to
prioritize investments in specific tools or processes.
One research stream helps managers estimate the
financial impacts of attacks. Rare high-cost incidents
can distort managers’ subsequent loss estimates, but
combining daily loss (value-at-risk) data with extreme
value analysis produces more accurate loss estimates
(Wang et al. 2008). And, a test of a resource weaknesses
framework [10] reveals that those InfoSec incidents that
decrease IS resource availability (such as by shutting
down a system or rendering data unavailable) cause
greater financial losses than those which compromise
data quality (Goldstein et al. 2011).
One theory suggests that disclosing investments in
InfoSec tools/controls deters attackers (Cavusoglu et al.
2005). Penalties imposed by law enforcement also aim
to deter future attackers (Cavusoglu et al. 2008), but this
form of deterrence is not always effective, because wellinformed attackers just shift their operations to countries
with lower cybercrime conviction rates (Png et al.
2008). One paper suggests that higher-value firms (more
attractive targets) should spend more to defend against
malicious attacks, and enforcement agencies should
focus on high-value targets (Png and Wang 2009).
Some attackers conduct reconnaissance before
strategically choosing targets (Ransbotham and Mitra
2009), although one study finds that attackers derive
little benefit from knowing whether a particular target
has very strong or very weak protection (Mookerjee et
al. 2011). A layered “defense-in-depth” security config-

uration contains controls that act as strategic substitutes,
blocking attacks upstream (Kumar et al. 2008). Such
layered controls might also deter attackers by signaling
that an organization is committed to protecting its’ IS
resources (Cremonini and Nizovtsev 2010).
Do
InfoSec-related
disclosures
influence
companies’ market value? InfoSec investment
disclosures apparently do positively impact stock price
(especially for e-commerce companies), but incident
disclosures in annual reports do not (Gordon et al.
2010). One study based on the efficient market
hypothesis also reports that InfoSec incident disclosures
impact e-commerce firm stock prices more than brickand-mortar firms, but increases in incident frequency
lead to reduced market reaction intensity (Yayla and Hu,
2011). Also, disclosure of risk mitigation efforts is
positively received by the market, and might lead to
fewer subsequent security incidents (Wang et al. 2013).
However, a firm that signals that it has invested in
preventive InfoSec controls is not likely to deter a cyberterrorist (Hua and Bapna 2013). A cyber-terrorist aims
to destroy specific targets’ IS resources for political
reasons rather than personal gain. Some cyber-terrorists
spend years researching targets, and generally they
attack fewer organizations than cybercriminals.
What about InfoSec vulnerabilities in commercial
software? This is a growing concern as organizations
switch from custom software to off-the-shelf software
products. When producers spend to develop new
product features (for differentiation), they might spend
loss on product security. Some attackers thus optimize
their gains by targeting differentiated software products
with large installed bases (Galbreth and Shor 2010).
Generally, opportunistic and strategic attacker behavior
influences security product effectiveness, ultimately
affecting vendor prices (Dey et al. 2012).

3. Technical InfoSec Research
Table 2 Technical InfoSec Articles
Author/s
Abbasi et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
D'Aubeterre et al.
D’Aubeterre et al.
Fernandez-Medina, et al.
Garfinkel et al.
Li & Sarkar
Li and Sarkar
Li and Sarkar
Melville and McQuaid
Oetzel and Spiekermann
Siponen et al.
Wong et al.
Yue and Cakanyildirim

Journal
MISQ
ISR
JAIS
EJIS
EJIS
ISR
ISR
ISR
MISQ
ISR
EJIS
JAIS
ISJ
JMIS

Year
2010
2009
2008(a)
2008(b)
2007
2007
2006
2011
2014
2012
2014
2006
2012
2007

Primary Aim
Detect
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Detect
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Designing and implementing the organization’s
InfoSec architecture is another important CIO concern.
Each element must be assessed on its own and also in
conjunction with each other element, to ensure that
organizations neither over- nor under-invest in InfoSec
capabilities and tools (Cavusoglu et al. 2009). Design
science research investigates how to incorporate
security elements into systems during development, or
how to design specific tools for protecting hardware,
software, and data. Each technique discussed next
purports to prevent InfoSec breaches by incorporating
protective features into systems or databases as they are
designed. For example, a Systems Design Theory
(Siponen et al. 2006) specifies six general requirements:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Develop security features that resist … threats ….
Reflect customer’s security requirements.
Provide abstract representation and operations for
specifying three essential elements -- threats, objects
and security features -- for three levels of abstraction –
organizational, conceptual, technical.
Integrate SIS to normal ISD
Enable the autonomy of developers.
Adapt to forthcoming ISD methods.

Security of a multidimensional data warehouse can
be improved via a UML-based Access Control and
Audit model (Fernandez-Medina et al. 2007), and
information sharing can benefit from a Semantic
Approach to Secure Collaborative Inter-Organizational
eBusiness Processes (SSCIOBP; D’Aubeterre et al.
2008b) and Secure Activity Resource Coordination
model (SARC; D’Aubeterre et al. 2008a). A systematic
“privacy by design” problem representation structure
supports analysis of shared-data privacy requirements
(Oetzel and Spiekermann 2014).
Attackers use various techniques to reconstruct
personally-identifiable information from redacted data
sets. Addressing this problem, new ways to protect
shared data have been proposed, such as random perturbation techniques for swapping data values (Li and
Sarkar 2006; Li and Sarkar 2011; Melville and McQuaid
2012; Li and Sarkar 2014) and other statistical obfuscation techniques (Garfinkel et al. 2007).
Since 100% incident prevention is not possible, how
can CIOs ensure that their organizations accurately,
completely, and cost-effectively detect breaches early
enough to limit harm from them? One paper, noting that
intrusion detection system false alarms are expensive
and disruptive, used a dynamic model to reveal “a tradeoff between rapid reaction and high accuracy” (Yue and
Cakanyildirim 2007 p. 350). To improve detection of
fake web sites, organizations can also apply statistical
learning theory (Abbasi et al. 2010) or develop an
“artificial immune system” (Wong et al. 2012).

4. Behavioral InfoSec Research
Table 3 Behavioral InfoSec Articles
Author/s

Journal

Year

Primary Aim

Anderson and Agarwal
Boss et al.
Bulgurcu et al.
Chen et al.
D’Arcy et al.
D’Arcy, Herath, Shoss
Dinev and Hu
Dinev et al.
Goel and Chengalur-Smith
Guo et al.
Hedstrom et al.
Herath and Rao
Herath et al.
Hsu
Johnston and Warkentin
Karjalainen and Siponen
Keith et al.
Lee and Larsen
Li et al.
Liang and Xue
Liang et al.
Myyry et al.
Posey et al.
Puhakainen and Siponen
Siponen and Vance
Tow et al.
Vaast
Vance et al
Vance et al.
Warkentin et al.
Wright and Marett
Wright et al.
Zhang et al.

MISQ
EJIS
MISQ
JMIS
ISR
JMIS
JAIS
ISJ
JSIS
JMIS
JSIS
EJIS
ISJ
EJIS
MISQ
JAIS
JAIS
EJIS
ISJ
JAIS
ISR
EJIS
MISQ
MISQ
MISQ
JIT
JSIS
JAIS
JMIS
EJIS
JMIS
ISR
EJIS

2010
2009
2010
2012
2009
2014
2007
2009
2010
2011
2011
2009
2014
2009
2010
2011
2009
2009
2014
2010
2014
2009
2013
2010
2010
2010
2007
2014
2013
2011
2010
2014
2009

Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Holistic
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent

Many studies attempt to help organizations prevent
breaches by improving user compliance with InfoSec
policies (such as requiring use of strong passwords,
restrictions on access to particular databases and
software applications, and adherence to rules governing
sharing of confidential data). A large body of work
examined whether and to what extent users can be
deterred from engaging in prohibited behaviors. Other
studies challenged General Deterrence Theory (which
proposes that penalty certainty, severity, and swiftness
deters users from violating policies), and some studies
enhanced GDT by incorporating factors addressed in
other theories. Because GDT has received only weak or
partial support, recent studies combined GDT with
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [11], [12]. PMT
proposes that two cognitive processes -- threat appraisal
(threat severity, likelihood) and coping appraisal
(efficacy of countermeasures and ability and cost to use
them) -- influence individuals’ attitudes about risks and
risky behaviors. Studies demonstrate that coping
appraisal influences employees’ intentions to comply
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with InfoSec rules, but that threat appraisal apparently
does not improve user compliance -- perhaps because
people underestimate risk likelihood and severity
(Herath and Rao 2009). A PMT extension -- TTAT
(Technology Threat Avoidance Theory) -- states that one
first judges the likelihood of an attack, then judges one’s
ability to cope with it (Dinev and Hu 2007). TTAT
predicted college students’ use of anti-spyware software
in a study that also concluded that avoidance and
adoption are not polar opposites (Liang and Xue 2010).
TTAT was subsequently integrated with the Technology
Adoption Model (TAM) (Herath et al. 2014). A study
that applied PMT to executive decision making found
that IS expertise and industry IT focus influence
executives’ appraisal processes when making decisions
about anti-malware software (Lee and Larsen 2009).
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) [13] states
that beliefs influence intentions, which influence
behavior. Reserach that incorporated TPB reveals that
users view protective security software (e.g., anti-virus
software) differently than productivity software (such as
spreadsheets). Self-efficacy and perceived ease of use,
which influence acceptance and use of productivity
software, does not significantly influence security
software use. Policy “mandatoriness” also influences
user compliance (Boss et al. 2009).
A Theory of Accountability [14] proposes that
individuals feel pressure to justify their attitudes and
behaviors to others. One study finds that audit logs
influence user compliance with InfoSec rules, through
four influential aspects: identifiability, user awareness
of logging and of audits, and electronic presence (Vance
et al. 2013). Rewards also influence compliance
attitudes (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Liang et al. 2014), and
research also suggests that users are more receptive to
messages emphasizing positive outcomes of compliance
(Anderson and Agarwal 2010), rather than negative
outcomes of non-compliance (fear appeals). However,
(which proposes that penalty certainty, severity, and
swiftness deters users from violating policies)
combining social influence and self-efficacy with a
message that consequences of non-compliance will be
severe did predict user compliance in one study
(Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Building on these prior
studies, a Composite Behavior Model (Guo et al. 2011)
proposes that users’ InfoSec compliance intentions are
influenced by attitudes, habit, expected rewards or
punishments, identity, and others’ disapproval or
approval of specific behavior. Alternatively, a Theory of
Protection-Motivated Behavior Diversity (Posey et al.
2013) proposes that individuals judge protective
behaviors along three main dimensions: difficulty,
degree of criticality, and common sense.
Experiments have yielded particularly intriguing
findings. One experiment compared rewards (positive

control) versus deterrence (non-compliance penalties),
revealing a strong relationship between rewards and
compliance and a strong interaction effect between
reward and punishment (Chen et al. 2012). Another
experiment (Vance et al. 2014) measured electrical
activity (EEG) in sections of subjects’ brains associated
with risk-taking. Before a simulated incident, subjects’
surveyed behavior intentions did not correlate with EEG
readings. After the incident, subjects’ threat assessment
survey answers did correlate with EEG readings.
Another experiment studied why some users fall victim
to security attacks such as phishing. Computer selfefficacy, prior experience with computer attacks,
security awareness, and general suspicion of humanity
were significantly associated with subjects’ ability to
resist “phishy” e-mails, while perceived risk of attack
was not (Wright and Marett 2010). Another experiment
showed that the following attacker influence techniques
increase users’ vulnerability to phishing: “liking,” social
proof, scarcity, reciprocity (Wright et al. 2014).
Why don’t employees just do the “right” thing
(comply with safe computing rules)? A study of antispyware usage in the US versus South Korea (Dinev et
al. 2009) suggests that national culture influences
compliance, and regardless of national culture,
employees are also influenced by social norms. In some
contexts, non-compliance with security rules is seen as
morally acceptable; in such contexts perceived certainty
of getting caught influences user compliance. In
contexts where violations are seen as reprehensible,
penalty severity has a stronger effect (D’Arcy et al.
2009). Users are more likely to engage in risky
behaviors when expected benefits are high (Tow et al.
2010). A study that combined theories of Moral
Development [15] and Motivational Types of Values
[16] reports no significant relationship between users’
moral values and their attitudes toward InfoSec
practices (Myyry et al. 2009). Another study (D’Arcy et
al. 2014) combined Coping Theory [17] and Moral
Disengagement Theory [18] to propose that conflict
between individuals’ values and organizations’ policies
leads employees to rationalize their policy violations.
Studies testing Neutralization Theory [19] find that
wrongdoers rationalize (“neutralize”) their bad behavior
via five techniques: denial of responsibility, denial of
injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of
condemners, appeal to higher loyalties. A large-scale
survey found no relationship between penalties and
compliance intentions (thus, did not support GDT), but
strong support for Neutralization Theory in explaining
non-compliance intentions (Siponen and Vance 2010).
Lastly, employees’ beliefs about procedural,
interpersonal, informational, and distributive justice
[20] may more strongly influence InfoSec compliance
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intention than certainty or severity of non-compliance
penalties (Li et al. 2014).
Other behavioral studies analyzed how users interact
with specific InfoSec tools. For example, although
strong passwords help prevent unauthorized system
access, many people avoid using them due to difficulty
recalling multiple passwords for different systems with
varied password complexity rules (Zhang et al. 2009). A
study reveals that well-chosen passphrases, based on
longer sentences are easier for users to remember and
use (Keith et al. 2009). Hypothesizing that the clarity of
a written InfoSec policy affects user comprehension (in
turn influencing whether and to what extent the policy
is effective) Goel and Chengalur-Smith (2010) asked 68
graduate students to rate InfoSec policies per 22
rhetorical clarity measures. Other studies reveal that
InfoSec awareness training is more effective when it is
seen as personally relevant, taps into learners’
systematic cognitive information processing, and takes
into account each learner’s existing knowledge
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). Top management
support influences employee compliance, and informal
knowledge distribution (per Social Learning Theory and
distinct from formal training methods) influences
employee perceived self-efficacy, ultimately increasing
InfoSec policy compliance (Warkentin et al. 2011). See
also Karjalainen and Siponen (2011).
Exploratory case studies directly examined users’
attitudes and behaviors. Vaast (2007) observes that
specific work practices affect InfoSec programs, and
that a security awareness initiative is more effective
when customized for each work group. A longitudinal
case study of two hospitals (Hedström et al. 2011)
demonstrated further support for Vaast’s Social
Representations [21] perspective, and challenged GDT
by arguing that organizations should link user values to
InfoSec rules, rather than relying on strict rules and
penalties. Another case study used Frames Analysis
(assumptions, interpretations, expectations, knowledge)
to reveal that specific work practices, routines, and
InfoSec attitudes at a Taiwanese firm influenced
employees’ awareness and compliance (Hsu 2009).
To summarize behavioral InfoSec research from the
perspective of the CIO and Board of Directors: we
cannot reliably deter problematic behavior. Some
papers conclude that deterrence is not effective and/or
that rewards and context-specific training are more
powerful than penalties. Educational campaigns that
change employees’ understanding, attitudes, and work
practices might reduce InfoSec violations and help
prevent breaches or mistakes – if training is aligned with
workgroup practices, formal and informal norms, and
individuals’ prior knowledge. More behavioral research
is needed to yield clear results that can guide
management practice, but to date the best managerial

advice emerging from this InfoSec stream is: reward
good behavior, penalize rule violations, offer training
that helps each user recognize how his/her behavior can
weaken or strengthen the information security chain.
Above all, do not rely on fallible human users.
In our set of 40 behavioral studies, most aimed to
help organizations prevent InfoSec breaches by
inducing employees to adhere to required practices.
While prevention is certainly an important aim, it is not
enough. The CIO and board would benefit from studies
that reveal how employees actually do prepare for the
InfoSec incidents that will inevitably occur (such as by
participating in contingency planning and “fire drills”),
and to what extent employees make use of tools and
information sources that detect suspicious behavior or
potentially damaging breaches. Leaders also need to
know how employees actually respond when incidents
occur. For example, to what extent do they refer to and
follow the contingency plan? To what extent do they
improvise their responses? What specific employee
behaviors contribute to effective and rapid response that
minimizes harm to customers, other partners, fellow
employees, and valuable financial, IT, and data assets?
Conversely, what specific employee behaviors impede
effective InfoSec incident response?
We also note that many papers (23 of 40 behavioral
studies in our review set) relied on attitude surveys and
did not observe or directly measure user behavior. Given
that employees are a weak link in the information
security chain, it is problematic that just three behavioral
studies were based on case research exploring employee
attitudes and behavior in specific work contexts. Welldesigned case studies contribute important findings by
revealing how social context and work practices interact
with employee attitudes, intentions, and behavior.

5.

Managerial

InfoSec

Research

Table 4 (below) summarizes the managerial InfoSec
papers in our review set. Some studies directly focused
on security policies and practices that managers set and
oversee, and some studies considered the InfoSec
implications of new end-user technologies. For
example, a study guided by Control Theory [22]
concludes that new wireless network security
mechanisms should be coupled with workflow changes
and policies for acceptable wireless systems use (Katos
and Adams, 2005). An action research study in a
multinational firm used a Bayesian evidential reasoning
approach to perform a cost-benefit risk analysis that
accounted for uncertainty (Sun et al. 2006). An
intriguing content analysis of 400,000+ searches in file
sharing networks (Johnson 2008) demonstrates that
mobile device use increases the risk that a firm’s
confidential data will be compromised. At greatest risk:
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large, highly visible firms with many retail accounts,
and firms that experienced prior data losses. Analysis of
an organization’s e-mail and spam data validated a
Bayesian real options model (Herath and Herath 2008),
and another risk assessment method combined five
financial metrics (labor cost, lost profit, information
asset value, business process cost, stock price) with
qualitative risks (systems, systems security,
information, business, shareholders) (Salmela 2008).
Table 4 Managerial InfoSec Articles
Author/s

Journal

Year

Primary Aim

Arora et al.
August and Tunca
August et al.
Backhouse et al.
Chen, et al.
Culnan and Williams
Dhillon and Torkzsedeh
Gal-Or & Ghose
Gupta and Zhdanov
Herath and Herath
Hsu et al.
Hu et al.
Hui et al.
Johnson
Katos and Adams
Kim and Kim
Kwon and Johnson
Kwon and Johnson
Lee et al.
Njenga and Brown
Ransbotham et al.
Salmela
Smith et al.
Spears and Barki
Stahl et al.
Sun et al.
Temizkan et al.
Zhao et al.

ISR
ISR
ISR
MISQ
MISQ
MISQ
ISJ
ISR
MISQ
JMIS
ISR
JSIS
JMIS
JMIS
JSIS
MISQ
JMIS
MISQ
ISR
EJIS
MISQ
JIT
MISQ
MISQ
ISJ
JMIS
JMIS
JMIS

2010
2008
2014
2006
2011
2009
2006
2005
2012
2008
2012
2007
2013
2008
2005
2014
2013
2014
2013
2012
2012
2008
2010
2010
2012
2006
2012
2013

Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Holistic
Prepare
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Respond
Detect
Impacts
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Impacts
Prevent
Impacts

Other research yields guidance for managerial
oversight of information security. A study based on
more than 100 interviews (Dhillon and Torkzadeh
2006) identified nine “value-focused” objectives
essential for managing information security:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

Enhance management development practices.
Strengthen human resource management practices.
Develop and sustain an ethical environment.
Maximize access controls.
Promote individual work ethic.
Maximize data integrity.
Enhance integrity of business processes.
Maximize privacy.
Maximize organizational integrity.

Analysis of a national software vulnerability
database suggests that adoption of diverse software

configurations/versions reduces risk across a network of
organizations, whereas (ironically) adoption of security
standards or best practices increases risk. This is
because a standard configuration will share common
vulnerabilities, leading to “correlated failures,” in which
attackers identify a weakness in one organization’s
standard implementation and exploit it in others,
compromising an entire network (Chen et al. 2011).
Focusing on privacy implications of information
security, breaches at TJX and Choicepoint were
compared through the lens of Normative Ethics, and
leaders are advised to focus on three objectives: create a
culture of privacy, ensure accountability, avoid
decoupling of InfoSec practices and policies (Culnan
and Williams 2009). Emphasizing employees as
partners rather than “weak link,” another study, guided
by a Buy-in Theory of Participation [23] and Emergent
Interactions Theory [24], concludes that InfoSec
controls are more effective when users help to prioritize,
analyze, design, implement, test, and monitor them
(Spears and Barki 2010).
Institutional Theory [25] was tested in a study of
how and why one large company adopted various
security policies, practices, and technologies (Hu et al.
2007; Hsu et al. 2012). Coercion (laws and regulations)
and norms (social influence by opinion leaders) were
influential, but imitation (of other firms’ policies,
practices or technology choices) was not. Senior
management support and employee awareness reportedly contribute to successful InfoSec management.
A case study at the UK National Health Service
(Stahl et al. 2012) finds that senior management support
and ideology influenced the creation of security
policies. However, vague InfoSec policies and those
based on unfamiliar language left the Health Service
open to varied interpretations, which limited their
effectiveness in guiding or controlling behavior.
Another case study, of five large multinational
companies in South Africa, finds that during early
response to an InfoSec incident, improvisation
improved effectiveness -- presumably by bridging “unavoidable gaps between formal standards/procedures
and emergent events” (Njenga and Brown 2012).
Does security compliance maturity matter? Archival
data from 250 health care organizations reveals that in
those with mature certified security programs, managers
express interest in protecting data, and tend to view
breaches as evidence of security program failure (Kwon
and Johnson 2013). A survey (Kwon and Johnson 2014)
finds that investments in prevention significantly reduce
data breaches, and that organizational learning mediates
InfoSec investment and security performance,
especially in the presence of external pressures.
Combining the theories of Threat Disclosure
Benefits and Resource Complements, a study of inter-
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organizational information sharing (Gal-Or and Ghose
2005) proposes that large organizations in highly
competitive industries have strong incentives to share
information about InfoSec vulnerabilities, threats, and
attacks. A test of Learning Theory (Kim and Kim 2014)
finds that prior software development experience helps
a software firm produce anti-virus products that are able
to rapidly detect malware. Prior experience with many
software products helps developers produce malware
detection products for the general public, but withinfamily experience is more effective for developing
products for detecting targeted attacks.
Large vendors and open source vendors reportedly
release security patches faster than smaller vendors,
patches are released more quickly for vulnerabilities that
represent higher threat severity, and public disclosure by
third parties causes vendors to release patches more
quickly (Arora 2010). Analysis of patch release
behavior through the well-known information quality
categories of confidentiality, integrity, and availability
[26] reveals that patches addressing confidentiality or
integrity risks are released faster than patches
addressing availability risks (Temizkan et al. 2012).
Legislative pressure might lead vendors to release
patches more quickly, and release timing also depends
on whether a vendor has a policy of distributing fixes
only in new software releases or is in the habit of
releasing frequent updates. Also, compared with open
disclosure, vulnerabilities disclosed through a market
mechanism reportedly take longer to be exploited and
are exploited less often (Ransbotham et al. 2012).
Pirated software is a special case; should legitimate
producers give patches to illegitimate users? One study
demonstrated that software vendors receive higher
profits when they provide security patches to users of
illegally obtained software (August and Tunca 2008).
Use of a managed security service provider (MSSP)
can give rise to “system interdependency risks” (Hui et
al. 2012). This can happen if the MSSP configures its
software to conform to standards and best practices
(leading to correlated failure risk, which increases along
with growth of the customer base). Use of an MSSP may
also give rise to a double moral hazard (lack of caution
when risk is transferred to another organization),
particularly if the MSSP is not transparent about its
security practices or is averse to investing in security
measures not deemed absolutely necessary to protect
their clients. A proposed optimal solution is for the
MSSP to offer multilateral contracts, specifying that if
any one client experiences a security incident, the MSSP
will compensate all clients (Lee it al. 2013). Cyberinsurance might be a better way to reduce risk than
transferring risk to an MSSP or entering into a risk
pooling arrange-ment (Zhao et al. 2013). Each option
offers different exposure and security investment

efficiency. A proportional hazard model demonstrates
that vendors that provide both on-premises and cloudbased services invest more in on-premises security than
security providers based only in the cloud (August et al.
2014).
Information security standards are developed
through inter-organizational collaboration. A case study
about BS7799 -- the first security standard proposed by
the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) -extended the circuits of power framework [27] to
examine human, economic, and social factors
influencing this standard’s development (Backhouse et
al. 2006). Because consensus was required, the standard
was heavily influenced by organizations with extensive
political capital -- more so than by economic or strategic
incentives. A New South Wales agencies’ mandatory
adoption of ISO InfoSec standard 27001:2006 (Smith et
al. 2010) was reportedly influenced by the perceived
legitimacy of the central government and compatibility
of the standard with existing work practices. Limited
resources, low senior management involvement, group
norms, and cultural biases inhibited adoption. In
general, research indicates that effective interorganizational information-sharing and collaboration
help improve information security. However network
traffic data from an ACM Special Interest Group reveals
that joining a non-profit consortium is impractical for
many organizations, due to high start-up costs, inability
to reach economies of scale, transparency issues, and
other factors (Gupta and Zhdanov 2012).
Managerially-focused InfoSec research has yielded
useful findings for the CIO and boards of directors. New
techniques for estimating InfoSec risks can help the CIO
justify investments in protective tools and resources
(and the CIO needs to continually re-evaluate the
organization’s level of protection). Manageriallyfocused studies also reveal how varied contexts (within
or beyond organizational boundaries) influence InfoSec
policies and their effectiveness. Unfortunately, no silver
bullet protects organizations. The CIO needs to ensure
that complementary tools, policies, procedures, and
human, financial, and technical resources are in place;
that every element is effective; and that the organization
has neither under- nor over-invested in redundant
InfoSec protection. The board needs to ensure that other
C-level executives understand how correlated security
failures arise and why inter-organizational collaboration
is needed, as well as the vital importance of employee
training, participation, and vigilance. A team effort is
needed to achieve and sustain a system of effective
internal controls and rewards and to instill a culture of
accountability and shared respect for the confidentiality,
integrity and controlled availability of IS resources.
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6. Discussion
Boards of directors need to work closely with the
CIO to ensure the security of organizational systems and
data. They can start by asking two key questions (similar
to those suggested by Nolan and McFarlan [9]):



How strong is our InfoSec prevention?
Are we prepared for incidents that will surely
occur, and do our employees and partners know
what to do when an InfoSec incident does occur?

Most papers in our ten-year review set, (71 of 91 papers)
focused on preventing InfoSec incidents by establishing
policies, incentives, and sanctions to induce employees
to comply with safe computing practices. However,
InfoSec incidents continue to occur on a daily basis
(including breaches that compromise personally
identifiable information and threaten organizations’
reputation and financial standing). Thus, preventive
InfoSec controls cannot as yet be considered reliable.
Therefore, more research is needed that examines (and
produces findings that ultimately improve) InfoSec
incident preparation, detection and response. Ten
studies in our review set examined technical, human,
and/or economic InfoSec incident detection challenges.
Two studies took a helpful managerial approach which
we label “holistic”. Just one study (Njenga and Brown
2012) actually examined incident response.
Thus, two broad topics have been understudied by IS
researchers (at least, in the AIS Senior Scholars Basket):




InfoSec Incident Preparation (recognize InfoSec
incidents will likely occur despite preventive
controls; establish an incident response team and
put a viable incident response plan in place; educate
employees on their roles during and immediately
following incidents; rehearse responses)
InfoSec Incident Response (ensure that employees
and business partners adhere to the incident
response plan and improvise appropriately)

These topics are of great concern to boards of directors,
particularly given risks – such as lost market value, lost
customer trust, and embarrassment – that accompany
large-scale breaches. Certainly the Target breach, and
other recent high-profile incidents that led CIOs to lose
their jobs, are important cautionary tales. Businessresearch partnerships that foster more studies on
preparation and response are greatly needed.
Practitioners are also invited to approve or sponsor
case studies and other interactive forms of InfoSec
research. Considering the 91 papers in our review set in
light of research methods used (Appendix 1), we see that
although many attitude surveys were conducted and

many econometric models were built, only eight case
studies were conducted. Longitudinal case studies can
help reveal how employee or business partner InfoSec
compliance or non-compliance changes over time, and
can also continue to explore how varied cultural and
work contexts affect organizations’ vulnerability to
breaches. Comparative case studies might reveal how
various combinations of penalties, rewards, and
education play out in organizations of varying sizes in
various industries, populated by employees with
different educational and skill levels, and other
dimensions. More importantly, given the topical
imbalance just observed, new case studies need to
closely examine whether and how organizations prepare
for and respond to InfoSec incidents, and to what extent
members of formal incident response teams, and others
in and beyond the organization, work effectively to
protect resources and preserve valuable relationships
with customers and business partners. This understudied subject is in need of immediate attention.
A handful of action research InfoSec studies were
published in our review set, along with 12 design
science studies. Interactive research methods such as
these help to ensure that studies are relevant and produce
useful tools that IS organizations, employees, and
managers can put to use. Perhaps it is time for a new
group of interactive researchers to focus on incident
preparation and response, which are not yet represented
in this set of action research and design science studies.
We conclude that, while existing behavioral,
economic and technical scholars may prefer to continue
on the research journeys they have already embarked
upon, there is ample space for qualitative scholars
(especially case researchers) and interactive scholars
(those who excel at action research or design science) to
investigate InfoSec incident preparation and response,
and to offer valuable findings that the CIO and the
Board of Directors can put to good use. Thus, research
arising from new researcher-industry partnerships
(which are often sponsored by CIOs and/or executivelevel industry leaders) might benefit greatly from a
focus on InfoSec incident preparation and response,
using case studies or interactive research methods.
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APPENDIX 1 InfoSec Studies in the Basket: Partial Citations and Description
Author/s

Journal

Year

Method

Abbasi et al.
Anderson and Agarwal
Arora et al.
August and Tunca
August et al.
Backhouse et al.
Boss et al.
Bulgurcu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Cavusoglu et al.
Chen et al.
Chen, et al.
Cremonini and Nizovtsev
Culnan and Williams
D’Arcy et al.
D’Arcy, Herath, Shoss
D’Aubeterre et al.
D'Aubeterre et al.
Dey et al.
Dhillon and Torkzsedeh
Dinev and Hu
Dinev et al.
Fernandez-Medina, et al.
Galbreth and Shor
Gal-Or & Ghose
Garfinkel et al.
Goel and Chengalur-Smith
Goldstein et al.
Gordon et al.
Guo et al.

MISQ
MISQ
ISR
ISR
ISR
MISQ
EJIS
MISQ
ISR
JMIS
ISR
JMIS
MISQ
JMIS
MISQ
ISR
JMIS
EJIS
JAIS
JMIS
ISJ
JAIS
ISJ
EJIS
MISQ
ISR
ISR
JSIS
JAIS
MISQ
JMIS

2010
2010
2010
2008
2014
2006
2009
2010
2005
2008
2009
2012
2011
2009
2009
2009
2014
2008(b)
2008(a)
2012
2006
2007
2009
2007
2010
2005
2007
2010
2011
2010
2011

DS+MOD+EXP
SURV+EXP
QUANT
MOD
MOD
CASE
SURV
SURV
MOD
MOD
DS+MOD
EXP
MOD
MOD
CASE
SURV
SURV
DS+MOD
DS+MOD
MOD
QUAL
SURV
SURV
DS
MOD
MOD
DS+MOD
SURV+QUAL
QUANT
QUANT
SURV

Primary
Perspective
Technical
Behavioral
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Behavioral
Technical
Technical
Technical
Behavioral
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Behavioral
Technical
Technical
Economic
Managerial
Behavioral
Behavioral
Technical
Managerial
Managerial
Technical
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral

Primary
Aim
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Holistic
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prepare
Prevent
Prevent
Impacts
Impacts
Prevent
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Gupta and Zhdanov
Hedstrom et al.
Herath and Herath
Herath and Rao
Herath et al.
Hsu
Hsu et al.
Hu et al.
Hua and Bapna
Hui et al.
Johnson
Johnston and Warkentin
Karjalainen and Siponen
Katos and Adams
Keith et al.
Kim and Kim
Kumar et al.
Kwon and Johnson
Kwon and Johnson
Lee and Larsen
Lee et al.
Li & Sarkar
Li and Sarkar
Li and Sarkar
Li et al.
Liang and Xue
Liang et al.
Melville and McQuaid
Mookerjee et al.
Myyry et al.
Njenga and Brown
Oetzel and Spiekermann
Png and Wang
Png et al
Posey et al.
Puhakainen and Siponen
Ransbotham and Mitra
Ransbotham et al.
Salmela
Siponen and Vance
Siponen et al.
Smith et al.
Spears and Barki
Stahl et al.
Sun et al.
Temizkan et al.
Tow et al.
Vaast
Vance et al
Vance et al.
Wang et al.
Wang et al.
Warkentin et al.
Wong et al.
Wright and Marett
Wright et al.
Yayla & Hu
Yue and Cakanyildirim
Zhang et al.
Zhao et al.

MISQ
JSIS
JMIS
EJIS
ISJ
EJIS
ISR
JSIS
JSIS
JMIS
JMIS
MISQ
JAIS
JSIS
JAIS
MISQ
JMIS
JMIS
MISQ
EJIS
ISR
ISR
ISR
MISQ
ISJ
JAIS
ISR
ISR
ISR
EJIS
EJIS
EJIS
JMIS
JMIS
MISQ
MISQ
ISR
MISQ
JIT
MISQ
JAIS
MISQ
MISQ
ISJ
JMIS
JMIS
JIT
JSIS
JAIS
JMIS
ISR
ISR
EJIS
ISJ
JMIS
ISR
JIT
JMIS
EJIS
JMIS

2012
2011
2008
2009
2014
2009
2012
2007
2013
2013
2008
2010
2011
2005
2009
2014
2008
2013
2014
2009
2013
2006
2011
2014
2014
2010
2014
2012
2011
2009
2012
2014
2009
2008
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2010
2009
2012
2008
2010
2006
2010
2010
2012
2006
2012
2010
2007
2014
2013
2008
2013
2011
2012
2010
2014
2011
2007
2009
2013

MOD
CASE
MOD
SURV
SURV
CASE
QUAL+SURV
CASE
MOD
MOD
QUANT
SURV+EXP
SURV
MOD
EXP
MOD
MOD
SURV
MOD
SURV
MOD
DS+MOD
DS+MOD
DS+MOD
SURV
SURV
SURV
DS+MOD
MOD
SURV
CASE
MOD
MOD
MOD
QUAL+ SURV
AR+SURV
QUAL+QUANT
QUANT
AR
SURV
DS+AR
AR+SURV
QUAL+SURV
CASE
AR
QUANT
QUAL+SURV
CASE
SURV+EXP
SURV
QUAL+MOD
EXP+QUAL
SURV
DS+MOD+EXP
EXP
EXP
QUANT
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EXP
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Managerial
Behavioral
Managerial
Behavioral
Behavioral
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Managerial
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Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Managerial
Technical
Technical
Technical
Behavioral
Behavioral
Behavioral
Technical
Managerial
Behavioral
Managerial
Technical
Economic
Economic
Behavioral
Behavioral
Managerial
Economic
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Behavioral
Technical
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Managerial
Behavioral
Behavioral
Managerial
Managerial
Behavioral
Technical
Behavioral
Behavioral
Managerial
Technical
Behavioral
Managerial

Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Respond
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Detect
Impacts
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Impacts
Prevent
Prevent
Holistic
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Prevent
Detect
Prevent
Prevent
Impacts
Detect
Prevent
Impacts
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